INTERACTION OF ETHNO-CULTURAL COMPONENTS AND SOCIALIZATION DYNAMICS AT MODERN STATES EMERGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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Abstract

Middle East had a unique social, cultural, economic and political structure throughout history. Middle East maintained its original structure largely within a broad time frame when it was under Ottoman Empire rule. The influence of the western world and modernization has resulted in a significant change in the Middle East as well as all over the world. The emergence of nationalism in the Middle East as a design of collective identity and modern state formations has revealed a new view at the social and political sense. Recently, however, the functioning of these mechanisms began to clogging, and the existing structures faced with the challenge of demand from society. The rebuilding of social and political systems in the Middle East on the line of peace requires a whole new outlook and approach.

Keywords: Middle East, Asabiyyah, Nationalism, Nation-State, Peace.

1. Introduction

Globalization of international trade activities with development on transportation; reaching to rich sources of raw material in virgin regions of the world by the imperial states; developments in machinery and industrial technology; growing markets and production requirements was precursor of the establishment of a new world system. Western world was shaping the regions that permeated in the direction of its interest by the ideological instrument of commercial capitalism and with its political and psychological superiority. When Ottoman rulers fully aware of these developments which took place in a relatively short period in the world history they had realized that they were late and continuity of the state was coming up against a great danger. Ottoman Empire that turned into a struggle field of western economies encountered with reality of division and sharing simultaneously whet imperialist's appetite with its Middle East oil resources. Actually not only Ottoman Empire but all over the world was facing with a big danger that might become an economical sharing fight.

It can be said that countries and nations faced unprecedented conditions in the twentieth century. Both First and Second World War took place in this century. Imperialism and nationalisms were the main reasons of the course and chaos in these wars. Finally, after 1980s many ethnic and religious activities started to increase and accompanied the process. In recent times, especially the factors of ethnic conflicts and tensions affected the world and changed it drastically. Probably, the place where this effect and change were the most severe and fastest was the Middle East geography.

Middle East geography is the cradle of beliefs, history, culture, civilizations, richness and struggles, virtues and tears, humankind and eternity. In order to be able to understand the change in the context of nationalism and state-nations, we must interpret the realities and richness in a correct way.

Today's Middle East is divided by political conflicts whose reason is unresolved issues that are both national and international. These issues exist due to the features of this region. In this article, we want to offer an original approach to the modern state formations in the Middle East on the process of rebuilding of Middle East in the frame of a new reading.

2. Unique Socio-Cultural Structure of the Middle East

Middle East is a special region due to its historical, social, cultural, religious, economic and political characteristics. The concept of Middle East was first emphasized by geopolitician Alfred T. Mahan as the place between Arabia and Indian Peninsulas which has an importance on sea strategy. Again it was used as Middle East Command by the English during World War I. Middle East is both the lock and the key of the

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world in geocultural, geoeconomic and geopolitical aspects. It is a hinterland that none of the world powers can ignore (Davutoğlu, 2001: 129-142). Middle East is the key of global economy and political-strategic balances. It stretches from Egypt to Iran, it contains the Nile River and Mesopotamia, it expands from Morocco to Pakistan. It is a geographical region that contains the cultural richness of humankind, the belonging of civilization, the petrol, the desert climate and the Mediterranean (Davutoğlu, 2001: 323-324).

Studies in recent years indicate that approximately there are 215 million Arabs, 80 million Turks, 50 million Iranians and 30 million Kurds in the Middle East today (İnat and Ataman, 2015: 13-379; Konda, 2011: 12). According to information given by Yerasimos there were 113 million Arabs, 61 million Turks and 28 million Iranians in the Middle East in 1995. Yerasimos emphasizes that Kurdish people, who are spread into four countries, are the fourth biggest nation in this region with their 21 million population. Half of this population lives in Turkey. The diversity in the Middle East is because of religion and sects rather than ethnic origins (Yerasimos, 1995: 117-120).

Middle East has a socio-cultural and political structure in which religion and ethnic structure can substitute each other. We can give 'Assyrianism' as an example about this situation. Assyrians, who are now a part of Christianity, were thought to be a tribe before embracing this religion. In 2347 BC Noah's ark came to rest at Mount Judi (Kardo in Assyrian) which is in Cizre region. Noah's sons names were Shem, Ham and Japheth. Assyrians lived in Damascus and embraced Christianity in the first century AD. These people are descendents of Shem's son, Aram. After the ascension of Jesus Christ, his apostles St.Pierre, St.Paul and his friend Barnaba came to Antioch in 38 AD and established the first center of Christianity. Orthodox Assyrians, Catholic Assyrians and Protestant Assyrians continue to live in amity. By Greek people who ruled Syria and Mesopotamia after the collapse of State of Assyria and Persians, or more precisely by Seleucid people who ruled Syria and Mesopotamia after the demise of Alexander; Northern Syria and Mesopotamia people were called Assyrians (which meant Syrian), and their language was called Syriac. In our country Assyrians live in Southeast, especially in Mardin. They live in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq apart from Turkey. Assyrians in India are not Assyrian in terms of ethnic race but they belong to Assyrian sect. As it is well known, Jesus Christ also spoke the Aramaic language (Koluman, 2001: 19-32). Assyrians have been able to protect their ethnic properties with their cultural and religious characteristics. They have been able to answer the historical developments and changes, and they have kept their collective identity. Assyrians are a social entity and reality.

Ottoman Empire had a 'multipartite structure' with a local self-rule system especially till the Modernization process. And Muslim societies and groups had their internal freedom. Then, because of the unbalanced structures of governments and societies Middle East's new state formations are doomed to an antagonism.

Islam, whose birthplace is Middle East, shows a great diversity. Just like Malcolm X said in 1964 during his visit to Mecca in pilgrimage season: *"I saw all races and all colors -from blue eyed blonde people to black Africans- in a genuine brotherhood! They all worship in unity"* (Weekes, 1990: 40). Indeed, the principle of unity in plurality of Islam has always been seen in history and it has always played a key role. One good example of this would be the tolerance and understanding of Ottoman Empire towards people from other religions and beliefs in nation system -despite some deviations-.

Middle East region is a nice example to show that Islam gives life opportunity and area to societies from different religions and beliefs, languages and cultures in history.

3. Between Tradition and Modernity Transition Process of Political and Social Structure in the Middle East

Ottoman Empire (1299 – 1922) still has a great power at the beginning of the twentieth century in the Middle East. *"Everywhere else in the Middle East, centuries of rule by governors who owed their ultimate allegiance to Istanbul had produced a legacy of Ottoman administrative practice and Ottoman culture which continued to affect political life in countless important ways"* (Owen, 2004: 5). Essentially, almost all of *"Arab Muslims and Orthodox Christians remained generally committed to the ideals of Ottomanism –as an umbrella term for people/subject- until the very end"* (Meouchy and Sluglett, 2004: 6).

Ottoman society lived through a fundamental change together with increasing Western intervention and the growth of nationalism. *"Between 1839 and 1908, sectarian violence tore through communities in Macedonia, eastern Anatolia, Syria, and Lebanon, leaving thousands dead and displaced"* (Gingeras, 2009: 19). At the end of the Ottoman period, Middle East had witnessed a series of social and economic changes as well (Meouchy and Sluglett, 2004: 3).

It can be observed that in the 19th century lots of Christian groups in Ottoman Empire began to see themselves as different structures and they started to believe that Ottoman administrators were a foreign Turkish group. The entity of Ottoman was seen as an empire by Christians whereas it was seen as a state by Muslims. The lands where Arabic was spoken were protecting their own customs and traditions and

maintaining their autonomy in a sense. There was bureaucracy in the center whereas the self-government of the communities existed in the vicinity (Karpat, 2001: 105-119).

The age of empires was ending at the beginning of the twentieth century. *"None of the major empires, the Romanov, the Hapsburg and the Ottoman, would survive the early decades of the twentieth century"*. World War I was a breaking point for Ottoman System and Middle East. As a consequence of the fall of Ottoman Empire the nation states emerged in the Middle East (Fortna, 2013: 1-2).

A new order was established in the Middle East. But it *"was not accepted tamely by many of its inhabitants"*. There was a rebellion against British colonial administration in Iraq and anti-British/anti-Jewish movements in Palestine in 1920. Meanwhile, France was experiencing problems in Syria, *"first by the Arab government that had established itself in Damascus after the Turkish retreat, then by a series of rural revolts culminating in the country-wide uprising of 1925–1927"*. There was a powerful resistance against imperial states (British, France and others) in Anatolia (and Rumelia) by Turkish forces. And there was a strong revolt in Persia too. *According to Roger Owen "nevertheless, in spite of all local resistance, there is no doubt that by the mid-1920s the British and the French were the masters of the Middle East"* (Owen, 2004: 6-7).

In conclusion the Ottoman Empire broke up into six states: *"Turkey and the five new Arab states of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Transjordan. Saudi Arabia and Yemen also emerged as distinct political entities"* (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 171). The new order was strengthened by imperialists. *"…the introduction of flags, postage stamps, and national anthems emphasized the distinctiveness of each state and solidified the political divisions Britain and France had imposed on the Arab world"* (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 234-235). Nationalism flattered local elits' pride as an imperialist political tool.

As a consequence of multilateral agreements the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were carved up into a number of states, *"each of them under the control of one or other of the victorious powers: the new Syria and Lebanon under the French; the new Iraq, Palestine and Trans-Jordan under the British"* (Owen, 2004: 6).

As we know, minority issues became a major issue with the formation of nationally organized states in modern period (Fortna, 2013: 3). The same thing happened in the Middle East after the Ottoman Social System. According to Meouchy and Sluglett *"one of the major consequences of the First World War was the transformation of the former Ottoman 'millets' into minorities, their acquisition of legal status and their development into political communities. In addition, the rise of nationalism in the various states often emphasized social divisions along majority/minority and confessional and/or ethnic lines"* (Meouchy and Sluglett, 2004: 18). With the collapse of Ottoman Millet System it was seen a necessity to substitute a new (national) identity which appropriate for new national-state structures.

4. Understanding Nationalism in the Middle East in the Light of Asabiyyah Factor

Asabiyyah is a good example of ethno-cultural facts and social coherence factor especially for Middle East countries. It is originated from historical background but also effects today's world too. Conceptual frame work of asabiyyah has been changing naturally with time and according to people and community necessities. That is why our studies on this issue is going on as much as possible.

When assessing the 'asabiyyah' factor on the emergence of nation-states in the Middle East, the explanation about 'asabiyyahs' in Islamic Encyclopedia can be an advisor (İslam Ansiklopedisi, 1965: 663-664): *"In Arabs during the time before Islam, it is an individual's being ready to protect his relatives from father's side or his tribe, whether they are right or not, and his binding over a promise for protecting their properties and capturing other's… In recent times, the theory of Ibn Khaldun about asabiyyah has been analyzed by T.Khemiri thoroughly and it has been observed that this concept is not very different from nationalism."*

An Arabic proverb says: *"I stand against my brothers; I and my brothers stand against our cousins; I, my brothers and our cousins stand against the world."* 'Asabiyyah' turns this rhetoric and nationalist proverb into: "Neither you can stand against your brothers nor you and your brothers can stand against your cousins; but we, as members of our nation family stand against the world." Therefore it tries to involve many different and complicated networks and little categories (tribes, ethnic groups etc.) and tries to make it become a large big categorical identity. Nationalist discourse suggests that it contains people from each category without touching upon internal differences. Ideal type is person's, as an individual, directly being a member of his nation. Ethnicity is in some place between nationalism and kinship. Ethnic identities emerged as the result of different groups' living together on same lands and intensifying their relationships (Calhoun, 2007: 55-56).

Ibn Khaldun states that 'asabiyyah' does not have a reality and it's hypothetical. This is very striking. According to him, 'asabiyyah' is useful in that it creates a close relationship and communication among people. If there is a common background and history this bond works and makes people take actions. If this bond does not cover an open and a close period, people lose their interest and they do not take actions (Ibn Khaldun, 1980: V. 1: 264-265).

'Asabiyyah' is put forward by Ibn Khaldun as a total sociological concept. If the existence of 'asabiyyah' forms the state, its eradication will be the end of the state. No matter what personal qualities a

leader has, he cannot succeed unless he takes the support of his group, 'asabiyyah' so to speak. Ibn Khaldun then talks about the goal of 'asabiyyah', dominion (this can be seen as the equivalence of nation-state). Independence, sanction and right to use force are basic elements of a dominion. Financial and military elements come to the forefront in dominion. People need an order that will regulate the relationships between them and will hinder them from being unfair to each other. State (reign) is a very natural case for people. Not every 'asabiyyah' means state and reign. The 'asabiyyah' that has the state and the reign rule the people. It is what makes them obey and pay their taxes, protects their borders and leaves no authority but itself (Ibn Khaldun, 1997: 472-473; Ibn Khaldun, 2004: 265-266). Emergence of the state is very different from 'kin asabiyyah', which depends on the blood and family tree. Here, there is an emphasis on the state's independence and sovereignty. The process of the transition from 'kin asabiyyah' to state can be possible by making different rational reasons come together.

The importance of ethnicity and such collective consciousness is measured by their functionality in 'political struggle'. This functionality is determined by the culture that is related to history, social conditions and solidarity. For example, Ibn Khaldun knew that 'tribe' represented 'political asabiyyah' in the traditional world. This relationship between the regimen and the tribe raises the awareness of tribes and creates an atmosphere which makes the tribes an important partnership. For instance, during Saddam era, Iraqi government belonged to 'Tikrit' tribe and in some African states, the party and the tribe overlapped. This acknowledges the fact that what renders collective consciousness valuable is the political function (Bostancı, 1999: 22-23).

The factors of Saddam Hussein's continuous regimen from 1979 to 2003 were; enlarged tribal structure, Ba'th (Baas) Party, bureaucracy and army. He attributed his authority and legality to tribal commitment, personal honor, 'asabiyyah' (social solidarity) that was observed by Ibn Khaldun in nomadic Arab societies and autonomous social, financial and political operation. Saddam Hussein's family was a member of Sunni Arab El-Tikriti family that was settled in the north of Baghdad (Boztemur, 2006-2007: 71-72).

Taha Akyol's evaluations about tribal spirit in the sense of readings of Ibn Khaldun will enable us to understand this sense of belonging in the Middle East (Akyol, 1988: 24): "*Tribe is not just a spirit or a mentality. It's also a social structure that creates them. Social power, social hierarchy, social values are all related to the concept of tribe. Everything that belongs to my tribe is good, everything that belongs to your tribe is worthless. If my tribe is strong, I am also strong, if my tribe is weak, I am also weak. Divine metaphysics that is supra-ages and supra-societies was first seen in this social structure where people were organized as tribes. When Islamic civilization is developed, his structure of society will also change in the direction of Islam's historical mission. With Ibn Khaldun's words, it will transform from nomadic life to settled life.*"

Let's we can another perfect sample from history to evaluate transformation of Asabiyyah approaches in History. Prophet Muhammad's words he said in the Last Sermon that can be seen as the universal declaration of human rights "*O People! Your God is one, your ancestor is one. All mankind is from Adam and Eve. Adam is created from the soil. Before the Allah your most reverend and grateful ones those who beware the Allah. An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab nor a non-Arab except by piety and good action. Beware! Have I not conveyed the message?... O Allah witness!*" words emphasizes that the humankind has one origin and when we assess the people we should depend on the values like honour and quality subliming the human before the public and the God, we should not depend on the blood and lineage bonds (Hamidullah, 1993: 276). Again in this context Ali's word "*Virtue never dies*" is one of the philosophies retaining its influence with the same aliveness (Hasan, 1999: 417).

5. Nationalism and Emergence of Modern State Formations in the Middle East
5.1. Nationalisms in the Middle East

Nationalism accuracy and losing of the large part of Ottoman territories caused pressure on Ottoman politicians. Turkish Nationalism arose in connection with increasing power of CUP (the Committee for Unity and Progress) in the Ottoman State. "*After the Constitutional or 'Young Turk' Revolution of 1908, the new government quickly busied itself with trying to rationalize and homogenize the imperial administration by effacing many of the regional differences. This attempt was firmly rebuffed by many of the groups. The rejection of the Albanians and many of the Arabs was particularly damaging*" (Fortna, 2013: 4).

Unconventional Middle East Policy of CUP in World War I was not adopted in Arab Societies. "*…the CUP adopted a special wartime regime for the region by placing it under the direct supervision of Jamal Pasha… Jamal Pasha arrived in Damascus shortly after the outbreak of war, entrusted with extensive military and civilian powers; he was the commander of the Ottoman Fourth Army stationed in Damascus as well as the governor of the provinces of Greater Syria. By the time he left Damascus in early 1918, Jamal Pasha was known among the local inhabitants as al-Saffah, the Blood Shedder, and his policies had alienated large segments of the Arab population from the CUP regime*" (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 154).

The partitioning of the Ottoman Empire did not supervene upon a struggle for colonial freedom (Meouchy and Sluglett, 2004: 6). But, Middle East Policy of CUP used as an argument in the Arab Revolt as well. During Sharif Husayn's Arab Revolt (from June 1916 to October 1918) "*…he tried to portray his action as a duty to Islam. He called on all Muslims of the empire to join him in overthrowing the CUP regime, which was, he claimed, made up of a group of atheistic adventurers who ignored the Quran and the shariah. Careful not to attack the caliph, Husayn urged Muslims to rise up and liberate their caliph from the clutches of the CUP*". According to Cleveland and Bunton "*He was not an Arab nationalist and did not think in terms of the ideology of Arabism. He was instead an ambitious dynast who used his Islamic status as a sharif and the amir of Mecca in an attempt to acquire a hereditary kingdom or principality for his family*" (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 161).

In this process, The states of Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, Syria and Transjordan were established '*de facto*' as a result of the military and diplomatic maneuver of Britain (and of France), "*and subsequently 'de jure' through the Treaty of San Remo in April 1920*" (Meouchy and Sluglett, 2004: 3). In the new states, "*the focus of power and authority switched from the old imperial capital to a new hierarchy operating from the new local capitals and under a set of rules drawn up in Paris and London*". The (new) mandated states were arena of conflict of interest between the mandatory actors and/or of the local elites (Meouchy and Sluglett, 2004: 7-14). Colonial states' interests were economic-oriented and their role was mediating between the colony and the international economy. As Roger Owen emphasizes "*The British and French attempted to manage affairs in such a way that they monopolized these relations*" (Owen, 2004: 14).

In each mandate state, colonial power first constituted the essential features (centralized administration, legal system, flag and internationally recognized boundaries) of a modern state. "*In some cases this was done on the basis of some pre-existing administrative entity, as in Algeria; in others it involved either detaching a part of a former Ottoman province (for example, Trans-Jordan) or, more usually, adding several provinces together (for example, Syria and Iraq). This gave many of the new states a somewhat artificial appearance, with their new names, their new capitals, their lack of ethnic homogeneity and their dead-straight boundaries that were so obviously the work of a British or French colonial official using a ruler*" (Owen, 2004: 9). Thus a new system designed in the Middle East that based on Nationalism and Nation-States.

It is stated that Western idea of nation-state (or state-nation) is formed around an ideology and a doctrine. Its main purpose is to create a nation. This idea was first put forward by French Republic. Some regiments in the Middle East also followed this example of France. On this impact, Middle Eastern intellectual's studying in France was very determinant.

Middle East involves many countries that are at different levels in terms of modernization. At this point, it is not appropriate to think that Middle East is homogenous. Political, social and cultural differences more or less exist. Turkey involves characteristics peculiar to developing countries. Nevertheless, there are differences in terms of government and society models between Arab countries and Iran (Mardin, 1997: 177-179).

Sami Zubaida emphasizes that Islamization and Arabization are two long term processes which affected the Middle East region's cultural history. According to him in Arab world, there are linguistic minorities like the Kurdish, the Turkmen, the Armenian and the Iranian (Zubaida, 1994: 160-162). The themes that emerged in Middle East through culture's being fictionalized ideologically are national and religious refinements. In national refinement; governmental institutions, with modernization processes, support a formalized, protected and chosen folklore. In religious refinement, Salafism movement of Muhammad Abduh and his followers which emerged at the end of the century and Wahhabism movement which emerged in Arabia show resemblance to each other. According to Zubaida, some movements that are overtly secular such as Kemalism in Turkey actually have very similar purposes with religious reform movements and they all reached similar results. Rejection of the popular religion became a part of the nationalist project and united with the national refinement of the popular culture. Modern fundamentalist Islamic political movements are generally against secular nationalism and they repeat the motto "Muslim's nation is his belief." In this sense they are also considered to be cultural nationalists. Instrumental regulations of popular religion exceed the borders of any kind of religious exclusion in Islam, Judaism and Christianity. The religion coalesces with myth and culture of the society. It also takes the form of populist nationalism as long as political Islam succeeds to put the society's support into effect (Zubaida, 1994: 181-185).

Arab nationalism arose as a supra-national ideological project in the Middle East. "*However, in the same way as each Arab nation-state gradually took possession of its new national borders, the Arab nationalist elites eventually became confined to their 'own' local political field, and thus became national elites*" (Meouchy and Sluglett, 2004: 13-14).

There are different aspects and dimensions of Arab nationalism than the nationalist movements emerged in Western countries. It grounds itself on a symbolically autocratic father image. It takes its power

from tribes and such regional features. The most distinct difference of Arab nationalism is its supra-state character. It's inverted into an idea of Arab unity. Being Arab was considered to be a unifying and descriptive supra-identity in a wide geography for a long time. It is based on the nomadic tribes in Arabian Peninsula in terms of ethnic and linguistic origins. As it is known, ethnic belonging is not gained through breathing but also through certain historical and social conditions that require a political conscience. Berber people and Kurdish people are considered to be Arabs by Arab nationalists, however it must be stated that these elements are not Arabs. In Ottoman Empire, Arabian language and culture took place in high culture but it couldn't spread through the society. In Arab nationalism, ideologically, the primary importance is of the unifying power of Islam and its religious origins are strong (Güler, 2004: 176-183).

Cleveland and Bunton emphasized that "…*three expressions of identity -regionalism, Pan-Arab nationalism, and Islamic solidarity- suggest the variety of alternatives that circulated through the Arab Middle East in the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman-Islamic order. In the end, neither Pan-Arab unity nor Islamic solidarity could subsume the regional nationalisms favored by the new political elite seeking to build their own bases of local power*" (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 237).

According to Sati' Al-Husri (1880-1969) colonialists have divided the Arab land into several states after World War I. And colonial powers prevented the unity of Arabs. Nabih Amin Fares (1906-1968) emphasizes that Western States implemented "*a policy of dividing Arab land into states and Arab people into rival factions and parties*". Arab unionist Michel Aflaq (1910-1989) states that "*Arab unity would mean the end of colonialism in Arab land*" (Chaitani, 2007: 1-2).

According to Wayne Norman, nation-building is "*half of the active component of nationalism*" (Norman, 2005: 79). "*Post-colonial, tabula rasa nation-building*" is a type of nation building processes. It is an "*attempting to create a pan-state national identity more or less from scratch in a multiethnic state when a new state is created within the arbitrary boundaries carved out by former colonial masters*" (Norman, 2005: 83-84).

Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Iraq and other petrol districts located in the Middle East have been the most important and favorite petrol production areas during the historical development of the international petrol market. This area has the oil fields that can supply the world's petrol demand substantially and the dominance on these areas means the control of the whole petrol market (Altuğ, 1983: 43-53). It is seen that the states or sheikhdoms established in the petrol areas of the Middle East neither had a big population nor an army. In the states that have army or a big population, there is little petrol production or petrol has not been found in these states. The reason why the World War I is named as first sharing war is this reality. Kingdoms and Emirates are revealed and supported in the states that are rich in petrol. Moreover in these states religious and traditional structures continued to live. In the states like Egypt and Syria where the Arab nationalism is strong, there were no petrol or other types of richness and there always occured an ideology bombardment. It is easily understood from the political Middle East map that when the map of the Middle East was being drawn, map officers played the biggest role and they made drawings and the always got compasses, rulers and miters with them. For example, the closest point to petrol sheikhdoms of the entrance area of the Persian Gulf was given to Oman that does not have rich petrol sources although there was not any junction. It is a very interesting example. This geographical area is really close to Iran located in just opposite to the Persian Gulf. This area became the land of Oman as it was thought that only Oman could provide the security of this land. This artificial divisions and regulations were done in order to create an environment in which the nationalism movement can always inflame. Kuwait's that is bound to the Basra city in the Ottoman period being excluded from the 'Red Line Agreement' was meaningful as it was known that Kuwait has the rich petrol fields. If Kuwait was joined to Iraq, there would be a very powerful Iraq state and it could be risky for the security of the petrol and for the stability of the system (Korkusuz, 2012: 321-322).

Capitalist development model, can simultaneously mobilize the material substructure and spiritual cultural elements between the political center and social structure. Nation-state's ability and capacity play an important role in this mobilization. Nation-state's ability and adequacy have a direct relationship between the power, potential and capacity of that country's bourgeoisie. This helps us to understand the fact of being underdeveloped. Social structures in underdeveloped countries that couldn't complete its industrial revolution naturally seek different reference and belonging frames for themselves. This can also inspire the ideological thought and attitude in these countries. In these countries, real production is meager, pecuniary resources cannot be mobilized and spiritual cultural sources cannot be turned into a social development. Ideologies in these countries cause the basis of the discussion slip by providing broad reading areas. This is exactly the tragedy that exists in the Middle East and many places of the world, especially in the third world.

In recent times, Islam has come to the forefront once again and this has caused the questioning of European based nation-state models. Struggle for salvation that was made for nationalism in the beginning replaced its purpose to Islamic confrontations in time. The failure of the nation-state model played a role at

this challenge (Zubaida, 1994: 187-190).

5.2. Rebirth of New States in the Middle East
5.2.1. Palestine and Jews from Tribe to State

The most dominant factor in the shaping of the Middle East in the 20th century was the process of placing Jews in colonies into the Palestine region, and establishing the State of Israel after the collapse of Ottoman Empire. During this process the protagonist is without doubt the Australian Jewish lawyer Theodor Herzl, who succeeded to convene the World Zionist Congress in 1897 in Basel, Switzerland, despite all the negativeness and obstacles. He is the spiritual and intellectual founder of the State of Israel. He worked systematically and with discipline. At first, he was being mocked but then he took the support of public opinion with patience and care. Reaching to a respected leader profile, Herzl shook the world with his book 'The Jewish State', which was written in 1896. According to Herzl: "*A nation is everywhere a great child, which can certainly be educated. But this education would, even in most favorable circumstances, occupy such a vast amount of time.*" Herzl attributed Jewish people's not being disappeared in history to their success. He described each and every single nation as 'common historical personality'. Two thousand years of captivity was going to end with the establishment of this state. He emphasized the external enemies as the factor of unifying Jewish people. Herzl said that it wasn't enough to form colonies that were dependent on commerce. Then he made a prophecy that by mobilizing every human resources, sooner or later a state was going to be established in Palestine. He claimed that the establishment of this state was going to help humankind get stronger (Herzl, 2007: 17-103).

Not being able to get a result from the meetings he had done with Abdul Hamid II, Herzl used very different methods and sources in his project o establishing a new Jewish State in Palestine that would include Jerusalem. Maybe this was one of the unseen factors in the collapse of Ottoman Empire. The processes that went on from the collapse of Ottoman Empire until the establishment of the State of Israel played a fundamental role in shaping the nationalisms in the Middle East.

After the World War I, there were mandate governments that radicalized the idea of nationalism in a great part of Arabian world and made them seek new things. Also, there is a close relationship between the idea of Arab league and the problem of Palestine. Israel that was established in 1948 instigated this nationalism (Güler, 2004: 208-210).

5.2.2. The Apperance of Nationalism in Egypt and Arab League Experience

Just like in the past, Arabian world still does not have a homogenous social structure. Especially Egypt has a very old history dating back to the period of Pharaohs. It is thought that the objective foundations of Egyptian nationalism were laid during the era of Mehmet Ali Pasha. But he had a patriotism that came before the ideological elements such as being Arabian and Arab League. In Egypt, Arab nationalism followed a unique path. After the invasion of the British, Egypt still maintained its commitment to the center of Ottoman Empire. The generation that was represented by Mustafa Kamil (1874-1908) is still a supporter of the Ottoman. Kamil took the partnership of place as a basis on patriotism and supported a continuous struggle against the English invaders. Years between two wars are a seeking period for Egyptian nationalist movement. It is possible to see the products of this seeking in the ones who put forward the Pharaoh history of the country, in Taha Hussein's attempt to consider Egypt to be a part of the large Mediterranean Civilization or in attempt to return to the romantic Islamic symbols (Güler, 2004: 212-219).

The emergence of the Egyptian bourgeoisie happened after the 1930s. It emerged after the abolishment of capitulations with 1936 Treaty and government's precautions for Egyptianization of the business world. The economic crisis in the world in 1929 affected Egypt gravely and reinforced the struggle against the foreign. Egypt was governed by inconsistent governments until the end of the World War. Political decisions were not made by the government. They were made by King Farouk and by his conservative and selfish consultants. In spite of developing a populist discourse, they used the resources of the country for their own benefits. There was a race of leadership between Saudis, Hashemites and Egyptians between the years 1936-1948 (Güler, 2004: 222-228). Sati el-Husri, who can be described as an Ottoman intellectual, was related to the men of God in Aleppo. He lived in Turkey for long years and he is an important name in constructing the intellectual foundations for Arab nationalist movement. He got inspired by German Fichte while constructing his nationalist thought. According to El-Husri, there are two objective principles of a country. First element is the language partnership and the second element is the common history. At the same time, religion creates a sense of partnership among individuals. With Ibn Khaldun's approach, Husri embraces the idea of 'the religion's forming a political society is possible through its strengthening the natural solidarity that comes from the natural relationships'. Husri says that anybody who lives in our country, speaks our language, is brought up in our culture and is honored of our victory is one of us (Güler, 2004: 232-233).

Arab nationalism movement meant an awakening after the collapse of Ottoman Empire in the

beginning of the 20th century and took many forms. After the World War II, it took the newer shape of Arab nationalism, Arab socialism. It also emerged as Nasserism (referring to the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser). Nasserism is the effort of rendering independence and anti-imperialism possible in foreign policy and rendering development and social justice in domestic policy possible at the same time. Arab nationalism shows differences from country to country; however it also contains some common descriptive elements (Güler, 2004: 9-16).

After the revolution in 1952, the pattern of being Arabian and Arab League in Egypt gained power gradually. With Free Officers Movement, Nasser collaborated with Muslim Brotherhood and then eliminated them to become an autocratic leader. Even though he couldn't reach a complete success, he became the leader of Arab nationalism through his popularity and courage. He was also one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement alongside with Josip Broz Tito and Jawaharlal Nehru. Egypt will undertake an important mission through Arab, African and Islamic generations. United Arab Emirates was established between Egypt and Syria in 1958. Nasser, despite not being ready to do so, told the US ambassador that they had to establish this union (Güler, 2004: 234-241). Arab League idea was formed by Ba'th Party (it means rebirth) in Syria before Nasser. The party was established in Damascus by Michel Aflaq, who studied at the Sorbonne and was of Christian origin, Salah al-Din al-Bitar and a group of intellectuals. Nationalist and socialist ideas took place in Ba'th ideology together and Aflaq exerted an attitude that defended being nonaligned. Aflaq defended a secular idea and it also tried to set up a connection between universal values that included Islam and Christianity. Ba'th was very effective and determinant in the coalition of Syria and Egypt (Güler, 2004: 242-249).

Nasser-Egypt identity stayed in the minds of people for a long time. For example, a barber in Mecca who belonged to Bedouin Saidi tribe could easily brag about being from the same tribe with Nasser. However, unless the economic substructure and cultural corporations -by taking the present world system into consideration- are reorganized in a manner that will mobilize the individual and social power resources, there cannot and won't be a complete and permanent success.

5.2.3. Arabian Kingdoms and Their Origins

The establishment of the regimen known as Saudi Arabia Kingdom today has a historical, cultural and social background dating back to the Ottoman Empire's regression and collapse reign. Here is a movement known as Wahhabism in Turkey and it has religious and political dimensions. Here the effect of this movement is significant. Muhammed bin Abdulvehhab, who is the founder of Wahhabism, was born in a village in the Najd region that is close to Riyad. He is from Hanbali sect's salafi school. Especially by regarding the situations which are not appropriate for his belief and ideas as innovation, he bases on re-understanding and manifesting the religion. He was weak until he encountered with the Muhammad bin Suud, emir of Diriyah, who is the ancestor of the present Saudis. Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and Muhammad bin Saud made an agreement about the religion's basic principles and they decided to obey each other. With this agreement in 1744, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab got a physical power to defend his ideas. For Muhammad bin Saud this movement will help him to extend his influence and to widen his dominance territories. Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab was the religious leader and the other is responsible for the governmental issues. When Muhammad bin Saud dies, his son Abdülaziz took the place of his father. He was more ambitious than his father (Ecer, 2001: 51-58).

Oneness belief always advices the good, bewares the evil and stands against religious innovations. Although it looks positive in terms of religion, this belief was drawn negative reactions in Ottoman Empire as it severely criticised the mysticism and sects. It was associated with Kharijite and Zahiri movements. Especially their harsh and rigid manner was like the reflection of their nomadic characteristics (Ecer, 2001: 64-96). In the presidency of Muhammad bin Saud, the foundations of the Arabic state was laid with the propellent force of the Wahhabism. In 1803 Abdulaziz bin Saud captured the Ta'if and threated Meccah and Medinah. He demanded submission from the public after he made a speech in Meccah. After the day of submission, the houses of Muhammad, Abu Bakr, Omar and Ali were demolished. As Dr. Abdallah Salih el Uthaymin stressed, he had a great role in the establishment of the Saudi state. In 1803, a bouncer named Osman took service with Abdulaziz bin Saud by gaining his trust and then he assassinated him by stabbing him from the back (Ecer, 2001: 97-134).

1807-1811 were the years in which the Ottoman Empire had both internal and external problems. Abdulaziz's son Saud who took his father's place sent letters to the Ottoman Sultan and to other governors. In these letters he invited them to the religion. Ottoman Empire suppressed this movement harshly (Ecer, 2001: 151-152). Tusun Pasha which was sent in order to suppress this movement became succesful by taking rigid precautions and by using violence. The governor of the Egypt Mehmet Ali Pasha also became the part of an activity and after 1818 Wahhabism became ineffective. Struggles continued until the first years of the 20th century. The process continued until in 1916 Sherif Hussein rebelled and declared his kingship. Until

1916 there were both war and peace (Ecer, 2001: 164-172). Abdulaziz bin Suud was supported by the British and Indian governments. Turkish army retreated from Medinah involuntarily in 1918. Wahhabis took Meccah in October 1924 and took Ta'if in September 1924. The British accepted their total independence with the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927. In 1932 he changed his title as Arabic Saudia King and declared it by converging the Hedjaz and Najd. Abdulaziz bin Saud was the King of Saudi Arabia until 1953. In this long period, he made many executive and social regulations. According to Şerif Mardin he established a Kingdom with a nomadic public (Ecer, 2001: 172-174).

Here it can be observed that Necid tribe's solidarity and unitedness were combined with a religious claim and content, consequently it formed the basis of an advanced state formation. Actually Ottoman Empire diagnosed this situation at the very beginning; however, the external and internal problems, difficulties' and obstacle's being structural, insolubility's being chronic in the vicious circle hampered the Ottoman Empire's next steps. Nationalism movement, with a new religious study, rising all around the world, dragged itself to a new channel by mobilizing itself around the cultural identity, religious claims and political purposes.

Daryl Champion stressed in his article written about the Saudi Arabia Kingdom that Saudi Kingdom family tries to develop a solid, radical and legitimate regiment image for those who look from a foreign perspective. With the change in the socioeconomic life, the 1st and the 2nd Gulf war increased the unemployment and changed the manner against the foreigners living there significantly. Global changes in science and technology influenced the Saudis. In order to meet the demand of the public opinion, there were reforms in social life and in education. There were elements of instability in the stability. The biggest achievement is taking the pulse of the Saudi population, and it means keeping the regiment stable. In the previous periods political participation in a system that can be defined as 'dessert democracy' was restricted to the sheikhs' traditional representation. Social structure consisted of very different communities that are not homogenous like Wahhabis, Sunni Madhabbs, Shiites in Hedjaz, Najd and in the South, those who live in the cities, in the villages, bedouin, traditional ones and modern ones. Kaaba raid in 1979 caused the chaos occured in the 1980's. Due to this raid Saudto is supported Iraq in the war between Iraq-Iran. New generation has a different point of view and the generation gap continues secretly. Although a fragmentary opposition (it is quite normal due to the different cultures) is not able to gain the enough power to change the government, it motivates the need of changing (Champion, 2000: 95-114). Essentially, it can be said that the political systems of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and *"the Gulf oil monarchies are experiencing varying levels of pressure from continuing change in their domestic and external environments"* (Nonneman, 2008: 36).

After Al-Masjid Al-Aqsa was burnt in 1969, there was a great reaction in the whole Islamic world. This reaction had a great effect on the establishment of the Islamic Conference Organization. Faysal, the Saudi King of that period, he always tried to support and intensify the need of solidarity and unity in Islamic world under the leadership of him and he also supported it economically. Afterwards Faysal would be killed by his relative. Anti-Ottomanism seen in the establishment years in Saudi Arabia started to change slowly and turned into a moderate competition sense. It is seen that the public opinion is tried to be unified around the motherland concept not around the clan concept. The kingdom they established by resisting, fighting and standing against the process that can be called as the irony of the history experienced the same the social, political and economic problems that the Ottoman Empire had experienced. However, Saudis has a great capacity to work in harmony with the international system. Moreover, their control over Meccah and Medinah in the inside and outside gives them morale and moral force. At the same time Saudi Arabia tries to undertake the leadership of the Sunni Islam leadership using the 'Rabıta-tül Âlem-i İslâmî' concept. Their military and political collaboration with the Western states strengthens their position in the district. At the same time, they do not oppose to Israel explicitly and therefore they do not catch the attention. They make sure about their security by supporting Syria economically and they pave the way of international transfer of the Saudi capital thanks to their investments in Lebanon (Korkusuz, 2012: 312-313).

When we handle Arabian Kingdoms, it could be need to touch on The Kingdom of Iraq. "*Iraq established of remnants of the Ottoman Empire in 1920. Iraq was governed as a League of Nations mandate by Great Britain until 1932*". The Iraqi monarchy ruled by Faysal (between 1921-1933), who is the son of Sherif Hussein with a generally pro-western orientation (Hahn, 2007: 74). At this period there was a tie between Faysal and Iraq's nationalists. The two tendencies among the founder elites that ruled the Iraq since 1918 came up between the Iraq's Arab identity and distinct Iraq identity. While the minority group emphasized a different Iraq nationalism using the 'patriotism', the majority group made the Pan-Arabism dominant trend of the Iraq politics using the 'nationalism' concept. Iraq nationalism looks like a state that looks for its nation in the discrimination of nations looking for their states and states looking their nations and stands in the middle as an unsuccessful movement. Primarily, a sparkle came up among the Arab intellectuals in the form of cultural and literary awakening as the dimension of the Ottoman Syria and Islamic Modernism in Egypt at

the end of the 21th century. After 1908 period, in the setting in which the communication at its climax, the Arabic students in İstanbul, Harbiye Mülkiye and Hukuk Mektebi established various communities and published magazines and newspapers. This increase in momentum is obvious. As Sunni Arabs in Iraq are less than Shii population, they sustained their commitment to Ottoman Empire. However, on the contrary to the Sunni Arab notables, there were nationalism sparkles among the officers native to Iraq receiving education in Istanbul. Together with the Sherif Hussein's Arab rebellion in 1916 they worked for Faysal and these staff established the new Iraq. Iraq nationalism developed in a way where the Kurdish and Arab Shiis are alienated (Çetinsaya, 2005: 57-59). But it has to be said that *"with the Shi'a and Kurds constituting some 75 percent of the Iraqi population"* (al-Khafaji, 2000: 279). It had become a serious problem especially in the war period. As Isam al-Khafaji stated *"The rise of Iraqi nationalism, and the atmosphere of war preparation in 1980, made it possible for the regime to deport no less than a quarter of a million Iraqi Shi'a to Iran"*. *"The Kurdish leadership, however, did not live up to the expectations of the Ba'th during the Iran-Iraq War. For the Kurds, this was a war between two alien and hostile regimes"* (al-Khafaji, 2000: 278-279). The Halabja chemical attack was one of the tragic results of this political debate.

Through the Iran-Iraq War, a new hierarchy tribes and elites emerged. Isam al-Khafaji analyses the political structure of post-war period: *"Thus, by the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi society seemed to have developed a new structure, whereby the most decisive political and administrative functions were fulfilled by Tikritis, followed by Samarra'is, Douris, and Jubouris, all of whom belong to the region north of Baghdad and south of Mosul. The economic elite came mostly from the Ramadi region west of Baghdad, besides those from Tikrit and Mosul. However, there were many affluent and influential Kurdish, Shi'ite, and Christian businessmen and families who had close relations with the regime and reaped tremendous fortunes through their connections. The Shi'ites, Kurds, and Christians were more prevalent in the lower echelons of the state hierarchy and the business community"* (al-Khafaji, 2000: 280). After the US occupation of Iraq (from March 2003 to December 2011), there is 'a new triple formation' in Iraq today.

5.2.4. Religious and National Dynamics on the Formation Process of Modern Iran

Iran as one of the most influential states in the Middle East followed a historical course that goes towards to the Iranian idea by crossing three waves. The first wave occured via the Persian nationalism, it is western. It was an ideology that internalizes the mission of making the people living in Iran Persian by claiming that the people living in Iran are form the Aryan race. After the Kaçar Dynasty's collapse in 1924 modern nationalism became the dominant power. The intellectuals establishing the grounds of this nationalism movement were all Azeri Turks except Mirga Aga Han Kirmani. In the development process of modern Persian nationalism, Masonry Persian Oligarchy living in India, Zionists and Armenian Dashnaktsutiun Organization supported this movement. Rıza Han aiming to establish a Modern Iran went into chauvinist Persian nationalism understanding wholeheartedly. Traditional Persian nationalism was the second wave. It was a movement trying to construct Iranian national identity as the Shi'a. It showed up in the 21th century as the anti-western movement. The 'Tobacco Campaign' occurred in 1890 was the origin of birth of the all nationalist movements in Iran. When the Reji Company bought the 50 year tobacco production and trade right from the Kaçar Dynasty in 1890, traders and mollahs protested and restrained the usage of tobacco. This new front includes the religious and nationalist elements. In this process, Cemalettin Afgani who travelled Afghanistan, Ottoman Empire and the Europe put forward the question that "Why Muslims became weak?" and he tried to find and answer to it. He aimed Pan-Islamism and he did not accept himself as a nationalist. Also Mirza Hussein Naini questioned the Muslims' backwardness and the Europe's development. He also tried to combine the Islamic and national values. Celal Al Ahmet, who regards the religion as a struggle tool against the west, was Shiite. Ali Şeriati who comes afterwards would make his postgraduate in Sorbone University and would put forward the theory of coming back to the core. According to Şeriati *"If the Third World human cannot turn back to the cultural identity identified with the religion, they cannot struggle against the imperialism."* According to him nationality and religion are unified in Iran. The traditional Persian Nationality won a seat in the political field together with the Iran Islamic Republic in 1979 (Bayır, 2001: 5-14).

Nationalism's third wave in Iran can be interpreted as "Iranianism". S. Muhammed Hatemi and Abdulkerim Suruş were the important thinkers. Hatemi waits for the birth of the new civilization and considers the 'revolution' to be the first step in this path. According to Hatemi, although Iran includes ethnic, linguistic and religious differences, Iranianism is higher than everything. According to Sadeg Ziba Kelam, Iran has an ethnic mosaic structure. And he adds this question: *"Did we manage to gather Arabs, Kurds, Belucis, Sunnis and Shiis around the same center and make them feel one?"* According to Bayır; Persian nationalism was born against the anti-Islamism and excessive westernism movements and the government trying to add a sacred dimension to the Persian language tried to suppress other identities under the religious identity. The ideology uniting the Modernity, Iranianism and Muslimism summarizes the ultimate point that Persian nationalism reached (Bayır, 2001: 14-18).

The Middle East is not only the interest and conflict field of the leading systems of the world, but also it is a field of resistance and opposition. The happenings in Iran in 1907, in Ottoman Empire in 1908 and the new changes and regulations both in Iran and Turkey after the World War II, 1979 Iranian Revolution and 1980 Coup d'etat in Turkey look like the processes and facts that run in their courses in parallel with historical, social and political resemblances. Iran and Turkey draw attention as two different polars that stand near or against the global powers (Korkusuz, 2012: 315).

USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, regiment change occurred in the same year, two-sided cold war period in the 1980's; these all were the signals of the new era. It is possible to observe that the phenomenon that we can say nationalist movements in the Middle East and in the other countries of the world started to become dominant issue all around world since the 1980's. Therefore, third era's being dealt with and being examined together with the 1980's is more appropriate.

5.2.5. Lebanon as a State of Ethnic and Religious Pluralism

Lebanon that shows the example of conflict in terms of ethnicity and religious identity in the Middle East, that has the Beirut regarded as the Paris of the Middle East in its borders is a state that is divided socially and there are the states which are authoritarian. Lebanon remained under French mandatory rule between 1920-1943. "*A political entity of some 1.1 million inhabitants and seventeen religious sects at the time of its independence, the country was adversely affected by the absence of a national consensus, as much as its political development was stunted by French rule. Indeed, French policy deepened existing divisions.*" The idea of a "Greater Lebanon" was implemented with gaining independence. As specified in the 1926 constitution and later reaffirmed in the 1943 National Pact, coalition between the dominant Christian elite and its urban Sunni cohorts agree on Michel Chiha's 'vision of Lebanon': "*Lebanon the mountain of refuge and Lebanon the meeting place*" (Gendzier, 2006: 50). National Pact was an unwritten agreement between the Christian and Sunni elite over the political identity and administrative structure of Lebanon, which take "*a power sharing among all sects*" as a principle (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: xii). Despite not being ideal, Lebanon has a democratic tradition and has a liberal history in terms of economy. These traits make Lebanon different from other Arab states. %93 of the population is Arab, and there were Armenians, Rums, and Turks living in small communities. %75 of the population is consisted of Muslims from various sects, the rest of the population is consisted of Christians from the Catholic sect. The majority of the Muslims are Shiis. The second biggest group is Maronites. Their roots date back to the 4th century. Sunnis are the third biggest group with approximately 600,000 people. Although Shiis are high in number, they are kept away from the political power and they are set back economically. The economy of the Lebanon is unstable industrially and socially. The civil war in Lebanon in 1975 gained an appearance overlapping with the economic inequalities and social differences. It is shaped as the war of mountanious Lebanon, Bekaa which is backward and southern districts. The biggest reason behind the political separation and lackness of Lebanon upper identity is that the sides in the conflicts can easily find the external protectors and trustees that will support them in these conflicts. Traditionally the French support the Christian Maronites. Pan-Arab nationalism's gaining power in the Arab world revealed the opposition in 'Sunnis'. The second direct intervention to Lebanon is made by the USA and Israel and the last intervention is made by Iran. Sometimes Syria can be influential together with Iran. The civil war between 1975-1976 bring the becoming Lebanese concept into the politics. Hafız Esad's death and Israel's famous operation's failure in 1996 led Hezbollah in Lebanon gain more power. It is necessary to develop common citizenship criterion involves every citizen. Afterwards these criterions must be actualized with a constitutional text (Alkan, 2000: 289-312).

Although the mystery of the assassination aiming at Lebanon's Prime Minister Refik Hariri has not been solved yet, it can be considered to be the solid proof that shows Lebanon is also on verge of a new era.

5.2.6. Tribes and State Formation in Jordan

Jordan's formation process goes back to the 1916 Arab Revolt that led by the Hashemite family (Sharif Husayn and his sons) against the Ottoman Empire. King Husayn bin Talal, want to gain Jordan's legitimacy and "*took pains to stress his descent from the Quraysh, the tribe of the Prophet Muhammad*". Tribalism took an important place in the development of Jordan" (Alon, 2007: 2).

Jordan distinguished from other British colonial settings with "*a small and homogeneous population; the existence of a very small educated urban population (the sector of the population potentially most inclined towards anti-colonial nationalism), and a low level of economic development*" (Alon, 2007: 150). According to Yoav Alon "*in fact, very little attempt to create national consciousness was made by the local elite or the central government. The British were careful not to encourage nationalism, seeing it as the main threat to their position and that of their clients*". It can be said that, Jordanian nationalism developed in the context of the incorporation of the Palestinian population (refugees those came to Jordan during the Arab – Israeli Conflict) into the country (Alon, 2007: 151).

In the process of state-formation in Transjordan tribes were active participants. For tribes, "*state*

authorities constantly had to negotiate their policies with the tribes. They frequently had to modify these policies, or sometimes withdraw them altogether, in the face of opposition. Abundant examples demonstrate that shaykhs and their tribes exerted leverage vis-à-vis the central government. In this way, the relations between tribe and government represented a form of partnership, or even symbiosis". It can be said that *"In Jordan tribes were successfully integrated into the state"* (Alon, 2007: 148). Tribal identities have a determining role in contemporary Jordan. *"Tribalism is an integral part of the Jordanian national identity"* (Alon, 2007: 2). Tribalism and nationalism are not opposite in modern Jordan. As Yoav Alon emphasizes *"Jordanian nationalism is closely interrelated with the notion of tribalism; together they create a sense of intimacy between state and society"* (Alon, 2007: 156).

It should be stated that political participation of the people in the political structure of Middle East is very restricted. There is a grave disconnection between the ruler and the ruled. Rulers are under the effect of West rather than their nations. Since the basic rights and liberties are restricted, the nation's possibility of rendering their social and political demands recognized is nearly impossible. No matter what name the political regiment has, it generally appears as a police state. Perhaps, even in Turkey, the country that has the most developed democracy in the Middle East, the official ideology is in a determinant position. Most of these countries are tribal societies (Dursun, 1995: 20).

6. Re-Building the Middle East

From the point of Bhikhu Parekh's view *"despite three several centuries of systematic homogenization, nation-states have not succeeded in suppressing regional, ethnic and cultural diversities"* (Parekh, 2005: 14). Nationalism is seen to liberals as *"a strategy for enhancing stability"* in states and *"best form of social cement in modern societies"* (Norman, 2005: 79). National culture is *"the bearer of… a certain definite aspiration: realization of a common national concept of the good life, the life to be lived, ideally by all the citizens of the nation"*. It is imposed that *"a single moral and political outlook presented as discriminating between 'them' and 'us', between 'ours' and 'theirs'"*. Radically nationalistic sense makes national culture *"monolithic, omnivorous and ultimately oppressive"* (Maiz, 2005: 67-68).

At the present time, multiculturalism *"rejects 'western universalism' as the basis for allegiance to a given collectivity"*. It is seen as *"falsely homogenizing and a smokescreen for power"*. Multiculturalism declines *"the modern Jacobin view of the nation-state and the homogenization of identities"* (Gagnon and Iacovino, 2005: 26).

Will Kymlicka claims that because of the global economy and transnational institutions *"the historical ideal of a fully sovereign state is increasingly obsolete"* in today's world. He emphasizes that western states recognized that *"the suppression of minority nationalism was mistaken"*. And *"pressuring national minorities to integrate into the dominant national group has simply not worked"* (Kymlicka, 2005: 110). According to Kymlicka *"an increasing number of western democracies that contain national minorities accept that they are 'multination-states', rather than 'nation-states'"* (Kymlicka, 2005: 112).

These issues should handle more seriously when it comes to Middle East. It has a special social and multicultural structure. Middle East takes an important place for socio-economic development of human being. Recorded history begins in this geography. Middle East has a unique value for believers. All of the monotheistic religions emerged in the Middle East. It could be characterized as a junction among the civilizations.

Today's Middle East is divided by political conflicts. There are many unresolved issues that are both national and international. In recent times ethnic conflicts and tensions affected the world and changed it drastically. The Middle East geography is a place where this effect and change were the most severe and fastest. Today, Islam has come to the forefront once again in the Middle East and all over the world. The new situation has caused the questioning of European based nation-state models (Korkusuz, 2015: 1-8).

The nation-state model that was exported to the Middle East divided the societies. In this system a boundary indicates the political balance between the political units/states. Political units are characterized by *"the existence of a sovereign territory"*. However, *"the marking of borders on a map… (is) a relatively new phenomenon (at the end of the eighteenth century and at the beginning of the nineteenth)"*. Undoubtedly to designing artificial boundaries can cause conflicts concerned with natural resources, ownership of fertile land, and the like. As an example *"the political boundaries of present day Africa are a result of a political chess-match that was played between the colonial powers on the negotiation tables in Europe, by people who had never seen Africa, during the 1880s"*. If it's necessary to give an example from Middle East, the determining process of Palestine's boundaries *"started in the first half of the nineteenth century, and has not yet ended"* (Biger, 2004: 3).

As a result of nationalism and artificial boundaries there are very serious humane, economic and political losses in the Middle East. The need of integration is needed more than ever. May be the Arab Spring and the new social challenges will be a precursor of the peace in the Middle East.

7. Conclusion

In terms of both theoretical and practical nationalism debates continue to influence significantly and sometimes shake the whole world both globally and locally. Between the nation-state nationalism and ethnic

nationalism there are many problems ranging from the tension to the conflicts. In the context of personal and collective identities, the questions and problems increased. There are very serious humane, economic and political losses caused by nationalism and it is not restricted to the Middle East. Nationalisms still exists like a syndrome. The political, social and psychological reflections of the nationalist debates are observed everywhere. The need of integration is needed more than ever.

In this study, we tried to assess the rise of the nationalism in the Middle East and occurrence of the nation-state by considering interaction of ethno-cultural components and socialization dynamics. The perennial order's being upside down in this special are, identity crisis and new political seeking, internal coups and external interventions springs and autumns require new readings and interpretations.

It is observed that in the occurrence of the nationalism in the Middle East and in the Islamic World interaction of ethno-cultural components and socialization dynamics played a precise role. It is seen that the states or the countries show tendency to an appropriate ideologies according to their historical, social and economic positions.

We can infer from historical context and sociological realities directly as asabiyyah model for giving good example for etno-cultural parameters and human being activities in Middle East. Our motion is to develop and progress some real issues for example emergence of state and set according to new approaches but including old and classical views and attitudes with this study.

Human being is very valuable and much cherished. Therefore, his life, existence, values and beliefs are also respected. These features that no one's couldn't appeal individually when it comes to the communities and groups can take on a different nature. Quality is losing ground against quantity. The most important reason of this situation is that collective identity appeals to defense and the survival instinct belonging to the existence of people and security of life. This is how a security could drag the person to death and kill? People can do a lot of (wrong) things which can't do as individual when they got into social hysterical fit. Today, social systems and ideologies are making people a consumption slave not a productive actor of life. Today this situation gained a massive size and impact as never before in history.

Common sense, political and social cooperation, mutual understanding and dialog have great importance more than ever today. In this process human being will be able to overcome all the mental and social obstacles against accepting 'the other' as a reality without marginalizing, alienating and degrading them.

A spaceman says - maybe truth or fiction- *"When I looked the earth from the moon there were no borders"* was really meaningful for all of us. The Middle East and the whole world do not need fix red lines, we need the peace and cooperation motivation in order to shape the future better than now.

Today, as an obligation for humanity, a new unity and integration formations, conflicts management process, and justice practice approach must be produced and developed with comprehensive methods to involve modern world's problems and chaos.

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