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PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN POLICE ORGANIZATIONS¹

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Abstract

The central purpose of this study is to examine the implementation of a popular performance based management model known as Compstat in large police organization called Newark Police Department. The main question is if this model has improved the performance of this organization. This model has been implemented by numerous police organizations in the United States over the last decade. Data were collected in this case study through in-depth interviews, observation of the Compstat meetings and analysis of the documents, and analyzed using grounded theory. The study revealed that this model certainly improved the performance of the NPD. Accountability and responsibility, flexibility, performance measurement that leads to careerism and competition can be seen as new management values that emerged in Compstat era. Performance orientation became an inevitable part of police management. Two basic mechanisms in Compstat, assessment with tangible indicators and follow up, changed the evaluation of success and failure in the management. The findings suggest designing differently the structure and setting of the Compstat meetings in a way to spur brain storming and promote a learning environment.

Keywords: Planned Organizational Change, Performance Measurement, Compstat, Police Organizations, Accountability.

Introduction

Pervasive change is one of the predictable features of contemporary life, and organizations are no exception. Society's rapidly changing conditions and needs, demographics, market demands, government regulations, pressures created by globalization, increasing competition and resource constraints, and technological developments coalesce to make change a critical issue for all types of organizations (Fairchild, 1989). Pressure for organizations to change has increased worldwide as layoffs, mergers, and closings are becoming an increasing survival strategy (Lewis, 2011). In the case of public organizations, taxpayers and funding sources are progressively demanding higher levels of performance at lower costs, and these pressures also require organizational changes of various kinds (Tromp and Ruben, 2004). All of these factors as well as institutional and cultural pressures have led to more change attempts among both public and private organizations.

In this environment, all types of organizations have increased their efforts to identify new technologies, innovations and new management and performance models in order to address the many emerging challenges and opportunities they face, and to become flexible and adaptable (Zorn, Page and Cheney, 2000). Cameron and Quinn (1999) found that 69% of the U.S. firms and 75% of European firms have engaged in at least one planned change effort over the last decade. A vast and highly profitable consulting industry has emerged in an attempt to increase the organization's performance, profitability, accountability, effectiveness, legitimacy, quality, and customer satisfaction (Eisenberg and Goodall, 1993). Organizational change has become a regular part of business language and organizational functioning.

Concomitant with the increasing popularity of planned organizational change initiatives, the concept of performance-based management (PBM) has played a prominent role in organizational change literature. The emphasis on performance within organizations is a common theme in a variety of contemporary organizational change models. As implied by the business motto '*you can't manage what you can't measure*,' a key ingredient in the success of performance-oriented planned change initiatives is to know how well organizations and their members are functioning when compared to previous performance, desired goals, and benchmarks (peers and

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leading organizations), and to take corrective actions when performance fails to meet expectations (O'Connell & Straub, 2007).

Beginning in the 1980s, the movement for PBM was first developed by corporate organizations of the USA in the face of international competition (Rainey, 2003). A similar trend has spread to public organizations due to the concerns raised by politicians, scholars, and the general public regarding the performance and effectiveness of public organizations, especially in comparison to corporate organizations. In this process, allocations of funding were made subject to the development of strategic plans and use of performance data (O'Connell & Straub, 2007). With the influence of certain reforms and budget requirements in addition to increased public and government demands for accountability, lower costs, legitimacy, and credibility, public organizations began to develop strategic plans and adopted different kinds of systems for the measurement of their performance (Rainey, 2003). Currently, private and public organizations, including the police, are adopting different kinds of performance based management systems in order to respond to these demands.

The Case of Compstat

Compstat (computerized/comprehensive statistics) provides a good example of a PBM system that has been used in a variety of public service settings, particularly in police organizations. In recent years, pressures for performance management have been apparent in police work in addition to other areas. Like any public organization, police agencies must also respond to external pressures and adjust their internal functioning in order to respond to changing circumstances. Especially, government regulations in the 1990s fueled an interest in performance based management and transformation of the highly criticized hierarchical, centralized, bureaucratic model and operational processes in order to increase efficiency and quality of performance in federal and public organizations (Rainey, 1983). Many police leaders were influenced by this movement at different degrees and began to apply some of the strategies that were being successfully used in other public and corporate organizations (O'Connell & Straub, 2007).

Compstat is the most recent and popular performance based management system among police organizations in the U.S.A. Compstat emerged in 1994 in the New York Police Department (NYPD) as a new, complex, multifaceted system (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). It was initially developed as a means to collect timely and accurate data about daily crime patterns to initiate tactics and strategies, increase the flow of information and communication among precinct commanders and departments, and ultimately increase performance and accountability (O'Connell & Straub, 2007). Over time, "the initiative has been transformed into a more comprehensive form in its structure and promises, claiming to instigate the changes needed in police organizations and boasting the ability to reduce crime by making police organizations more responsive to management's direction and performance indicators" (Vito, Walsh, & Kunselman, 2005: 189).

Compstat can be defined as a "goal-oriented strategic management process that builds upon police organizational paradigms of the past and blends them with the strategic management fundamentals of the business sector" (Walsh, 2001: 352). As many scholars have pointed out, although Compstat's description emphasizes crime statistics, crime data, and communication, it includes not only these factors but also a range of management principles in its structure to respond to problems. For instance, "the use of different policing styles (i.e., real time crime analysis, targeted crime interdiction, broken windows enforcement, directed patrol), adaptive culture, structural reorganization (i.e., empowerment, managerial accountability, teamwork, geographic decentralization), and a set of innovative strategies and motivational tools are counted in as a part of Compstat" (Silverman & O'Connell, 1999: 130). Regular Compstat meetings are the most visible and important component of this model. Basically, Compstat is considered a police version of the performance based management system.

This study specifically addresses the performance aspect of this model by focusing on a specific police organization called the Newark Police Department in the U.S.A. In the case of Compstat, it has been asserted that Compstat had certain impacts on the performance of the NYPD. Although this performance improvement may be true for the NYPD, it is likely that implementing these kinds of models does not necessarily result in their intended benefits in all police or public organizations. Thus, there is a need to question the success or failure in each organization that implemented these types of initiatives without making assumptions as to their inherent success. As a result, an attempt will be made in this study to determine whether Compstat improved the performance of an organization as intended. If there is in fact a strong perception among organizational members regarding the performance improvement after Compstat is implemented, then the following related question will be addressed: How? To examine this point, in addition to opinions expressed by organizational

members in interviews, observation of the Compstat meetings and analysis of the documents will be used. Based on this ground, the main research questions are:

Research Questions

- 1) *Was the introduction of Compstat perceived to have improved the performance of this organization?*
- 2) *If so, how?*

1. Performance Based Management Systems

As the 21st century approached, a shift from the industrial age to the information age has occurred (Cameron & Quinn, 1999). In the industrialization age dominated by tangible assets, organizations viewed as adequate financial measurements that mainly took investments and profitability into account. However, in the new century, the value of tangible assets account for less than 20% of an organization's market values; this figure was 62% in 1982 and 38% in 1992 (Kaplan & Norton, 2001). In this new era, both corporate and public organizations are searching for new ways to measure performance. The sustained success and transformation of organizations has had less to do with market forces, investments, resource advantages, or management of physical assets. Intellectual capital, information, and knowledge became the main source of an organization's competition and transformation (Collier, 2001). Clearly, strategies for creating value shifted from managing tangible assets to knowledge-based strategies that created and deployed an organization's intangible assets. The organizations which took advantage of these intangible assets consistently outperformed their competitors (Kaplan & Norton, 2001).

In this shifting environment, it became more evident that traditional forms of performance measurement that relied exclusively on financial and reporting measures were insufficient and ineffective. These measures, which were thought to reward short-term profitability, growth, and shareholder value rather than long-term value creation lacked the predictive ability to explain future performance and timely signals for wrongdoings; thus they did not improve the ability of organizations to determine, execute, measure, and follow up on strategies and plans effectively (Kaplan & Norton, 1996; Henri, 2006). In this sense, the organizational demands for a more comprehensive and integrated measurement system increased.

In this line of thought, performance based management should not be thought of as a simple process of measuring and reporting performance, but rather as an integrated approach that involves measuring, monitoring, analyzing, and managing performance (Eckerson, 2006). In order to implement a performance-based system, data needs to be collected and used to identify the goals that an organization intends to accomplish, analyzed to determine the relative success in achieving these goals, and used to set new strategies and goals accordingly. In other words, "this new type of performance measurement system must include and be driven by an effective mechanism for management" that goes beyond simply reporting measurements (O'Connell & Straub, 2007: 2). Similarly, Bocci (2004) suggested that the notion of PBM requires the transformation of a simple process of measuring and reporting performance into a comprehensive performance management system within which an organization's effectiveness can be systematically monitored, evaluated and continuously improved based on two criteria: Its progress in achieving desired goals and missions, and the knowledge the system generates to guide strategic decision making.

The Balanced Scorecard, a well-known and frequently implemented approach proposed by Kaplan and Norton in 1992, provides a good example of the PBM system. Kaplan and Norton (1996) criticized the use of performance measurement data solely for control, retrospective analysis, and record keeping. They suggested that most organizations specify the particular actions they want employees to take and then measure to determine whether the employees have, in fact, taken those actions. This will ultimately bring about control rather than improve their performance. This traditional form has nothing to do with the overall improvement of one's performance given that it is not linked with the organization's goals, objectives, and strategies. As suggested by the idea of PBM, the Balanced Scorecard approach requires reviewing and clarifying organizational goals, strategies, and missions; linking them with the measures; translating them into tangible indicators; monitoring their progress; and finally, obtaining feedback in an effort to promote and support the overall strategy and mission (Kaplan & Norton, 1996; Ruben, 2004).

Other than the Balanced Scorecard, dashboards have been extensively adopted as a PBM tool by both corporate and public organizations. Dashboards identify a small set of key indicators and measures to track outcomes and check progress in the most critical areas. Dashboards allow organizations to monitor performance using key indicators much like an automobile dashboard provides quick reference to information regarding the most critical functions (Ruben, 2005a). In a more generalized explanation, dashboards are used to translate the organization's strategy into reliable, verifiable, coherent, representative, actionable objectives; metrics of

performance; and tasks customized to each group and individual in the organization. They also enable organizations to measure, monitor, and manage the key activities and processes needed to achieve their goals (Eckerson, 2006; Ruben, 2005a).

The Balanced Scorecard and dashboards are both PBM systems designed to bring continuous, timely, and relevant data collection for measurement, review information to identify the root causes of problems and eliminate them before they become out of control, and develop future projections and long-term strategic decision making based on analysis (O'Connell & Straub, 2007). Regular strategy meetings and other forms of formal and informal collection used to analyze this information are believed to play a key role in improving decisions, optimizing performance, and steering the organization in the right direction (Eckerson, 2006). Thus, the intended value of PBM systems extends beyond control, cutting costs, and measurement of performance; it encourages a multidimensional approach that combines multiple measurable indicators capturing the organization's goals, strategies, and mission (Kaplan & Norton, 2001). At the same time, the use of PBM provides the means of communicating and reviewing strategies; increasing coordination and motivation, accountability, and comprehensive measurement; building consensus and shared perspectives on organizational strengths, weaknesses, priorities and improvement needs; gaining credibility and legitimacy; and enhancing competitiveness and cost effectiveness, continuous improvement, employee involvement, and transparency (Eckerson, 2006; Henri, 2006; Kramer, 1998; Ruben, 2004). In this sense, performance based management can be used as a tool for the assessment of any planned change efforts or as a powerful organizational change agent by itself which can transform an organization.

In the light of these new approaches to performance measurement, corporate organizations that adopted mostly financial measures in the 1980s began to apply different forms of comprehensive performance based management systems in the 1990s.

1.1. Performance Based Management in Public Organizations

Performance measurement of public organizations was neither part of the literature nor practice until the 1990s. For instance, a study conducted by New York's Management Planning and Reporting System office in the 1980s found that statistics derived from various public organizations included practically no outcome measures or results. There was no consistent or timely information that showed where money was spent and services were delivered (Smith & Bratton, 2001). This lack of focus on performance measurement was usually explained by the lack of rival agencies and competition in the public sector, the traditional, centralized, bureaucratic model that was not responsive to society's demands, and the difficulty of measuring public goods and services (Smith & Bratton, 2001).

Similarly, "few police organizations were actually measuring their performance, and even fewer were accountable to the public" (O'Connell & Straub, 2007: 30). In such an environment, there was certainly a need for more entrepreneurial, competitive public organizations as well as police organizations in order to respond to the increasing demands of the public and government for better service quality and accountability and implementation of performance based management systems as a useful tool to achieve these goals (Rainey, 2003). In fact, the enactment of the U.S. Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 and establishment of the National Performance Review were responses of the US government to this problem in federal agencies and the public sector (Rainey, 2003). Through performance measurement and strategic planning mechanisms, these new regulations and establishments intended to cut red tape, increase customer focus, empower managers to obtain results, and clarify job descriptions. Allocation of funding, obtaining support for funding, and legislative initiatives were made subject to the development of strategic plans and use of performance data (Chan, 2003; O'Connell & Straub, 2007). Beginning in the 1990s, with the influence of these reforms and increasing public and government demands for accountability, lower costs, legitimacy, and credibility, not only federal agencies but public organizations as well began to develop strategic plans and adapt different kinds of systems for performance measurement (Rainey, 2003).

Due to the increasing use of performance measurement systems in federal and public organizations, scholars needed to search for ways to determine how to adapt these performance based management systems used in corporate organizations to public and police organizations (Kaplan & Norton, 2001). There were major challenges that could obstruct their adaptation into public organizations, such as the complex set of goals and difficulties in measuring performance due to the nature of the work, political interventions, inadequate resources, and funding. Financial measures based on profitability were not applicable to these organizations, and public organizations could not articulate their missions as clearly and consistently as did the corporate organizations (Rainey, 2003). As such, there was certainly a need to adapt performance based management systems for public

organizations that would involve clear, tangible, and measurable indicators, and use these indicators to show that the organizations were effective, credible, and accountable in fulfilling their functions, missions, responsibilities, and broad organizational goals (O'Connell & Straub, 2007). Within these efforts, various forms of performance based management systems were adapted and applied to public organizations consistent with their missions and functions. For instance, Ruben (2005) adapted the Baldrige framework to higher education institutions. Similarly, Kaplan and Norton (2001) suggested a modified framework of the Balance Scorecard that could be used by government and public organizations.

Within these modified frameworks, public organizations needed to clarify their chief long-term objectives that represent the overall mission of each organization. The other objectives could be arranged in order to improve the overall mission or goals. For corporate organizations, financial measures in the form of profitability and growth provided a high level purpose for their scorecards (Kaplan & Norton, 2001). For a public organization, however, this type of measure was not a relevant indicator of performance. Even other operational measures of the Balance Scorecard such as customer relationships, internal processes, learning, and growth need to be identified based on the organization's mission. For example, customers are not consumers for police organizations, and as such, their primary focus cannot be considered customer satisfaction. The customers, for police organizations, are the citizens at large who benefit from the services and legislative agencies that provide funding for the organization. Regarding operational efficiency in public organizations, the value and benefits of services to citizens replace any type of financial measures. Consistent with this, public organizations should recognize and focus on the concerns of the community they serve. For example, police organizations can identify crime rates, perceptions of public safety, and citizen satisfaction with police as main performance measures and indicators of success and failure. In addition, similar to corporate organizations, an organizational climate that supports change, innovation, and growth can be another important measure of success for public organizations. Finally, legitimizing the legislative support of politicians, citizens, and taxpayers in order to assure continued funding can be another important measure of performance for public and police organizations (Kaplan & Norton, 1996; 2001; 2005; 2005a).

Given its underlying assumptions, therefore, many different forms of performance based management systems, including Compstat, have been applied by nonprofit, public, government, and police organizations over the last decade. These kinds of systems are essential for the improvement of performance and transformation of organizations. Today, more and more public and police organizations use performance based management systems. These systems are used for documenting past and present performance; clarifying strengths and weaknesses; establishing priorities and reinforcing a shared focus and agenda for improvement within the organization; gaining credibility and legitimacy; increasing accountability; reviewing and clarifying the organizational mission; obtaining feedback to learn and improve strategies; giving feedback to employees regarding their work; distinguishing well performing and poor performing members; and motivating employees. They are also used for providing credible, defensible, tangible information in which to base organizational and personnel decisions such as new change plans, investments, new assignments, promotions, transfers, or demotions (Kramer, 1998; Tromp & Ruben, 2004).

1.2. Compstat as a Performance Based Management System

The development and implementation of Compstat by the NYPD in the mid-1990s is a valuable and leading example of a multi-dimensional approach to performance based management systems adapted for police organizations. As intellectual capital, information is considered to be a key component of Compstat (Collier, 2001) which indicates the use of knowledge and information as the most valuable intangible asset of police organizations. As suggested by O'Connell and Straub (2007: 79), "If the system is functioning optimally, the organization processes every single piece of information to generate organizational knowledge and analyzes it with a broad perspective to determine better strategies and improve performance". Consistent with this idea, Compstat facilitates the collection of timely and accurate information and uses it for operational and managerial purposes. It represents a radical shift in the way police organizations collect and strategically use information about performance to develop more effective, economic, and efficient strategies and to achieve greater internal accountability (Smith & Bratton, 2001). This internal accountability that is based predominantly on performance appraisal through crime statistics and the Compstat meetings where people can share their knowledge, skills, and experiences to collectively solve problems are two distinct characteristics of this initiative. As Smith and Bratton (2001: 454) argued, "the development of the Compstat system of police management involves not only a focus on measuring outcomes but also on managing for improved outcomes".

The NYPD case was the first in U.S. police organizations to use statistics and regular meetings to review current crime trends, direct and monitor enforcement efforts and strategies, create a sense of accountability, and measure and compare the performance of precinct commanders in terms of crime rates and effectiveness of the strategies applied to reduce crime (Bratton, 1997; Buntin, 1999). Compstat places crime reduction as an overarching objective at the top of its mission, and other operational measures are oriented toward improving such a high level objective. The use of this initiative can continuously facilitate individual competence; improve organizational capacity and flexibility, and thus transform police organizations into knowledgeable and higher performance organizations (Maguire, 2004). In this sense, Compstat has been credited with bringing about better relations with communities, increasing the efficiency of internal processes, legitimizing organizational support, and encouraging a climate that leads to innovation and growth.

Compstat consists of 4 principles believed to give police organizations the capacity to reduce crime by forcing them to be more responsive to management direction and performance measurement: (1) *'timely and accurate information'* made available at all levels in the organization, (2) *'determination of the most effective tactics'* for specific problems, (3) *'rapid, focused deployment of resources'* to implement these tactics, and (4) *'relentless follow-up and assessment'* to learn what happened and make judgments (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Buntin, 1999; Bratton & Smith, 2001; Vito et al., 2005).

In addition to these principles, Compstat consists of 6 components. According to Willis et al. (2007), the core components of Compstat were identified as (a) *'mission clarification'* by focusing on basic values and objectives, giving priority to operational objectives over administrative ones, (b) *'internal accountability'* for achieving these objectives, (c) *'geographical organization of operational command,'* (d) *'data-driven problem identification and assessment of the department's problem solving efforts,'* (e) *'organizational flexibility'* to implement the most promising strategies, and (f) *'innovative problem solving tactics,'* learning about what works and what does not work by following through with an empirical assessment of what happened and sharing this knowledge within the organization.

After the implementation of Compstat, the NYPD was able to reduce crime at a remarkable rate. In 1994, for example, there was a 12% decline in New York City. New York City had remained the safest large city in the U.S.A for the previous three years. From the year that Compstat began until 2009, there was a 76% decline in crime rates in New York City. In 2008 alone, New York's violent crime rate declined by 4%, outpacing the national crime decline of 2.5% (Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, 2009). The approval rating of the NYPD had a 73% positive rating, up from just 37% in a 1992 poll (Kocieniewski, 1996).

All of these results increased scholars' attention to the case of the NYPD and the story behind its success. Compstat has spread among police organizations as well as business organizations. The national publicity and scholarly interest crediting Compstat with the decline of crime rates increased its popularity and rapid diffusion among police organizations. This case study is particularly important as it is conducted in a similar organization to the NYPD and potential of this model for being adapted by many different organizations in different countries. The next phase of this study will provide details about methodology and findings of the research in the NPD.

2. Methodology

2.1. Research Setting

In this study, a large police department, Newark Police Department (NPD), in the east coast of the USA was selected for an in-depth analysis of performance aspect of Compstat. This police department was selected due to its similarities with the NYPD. First and foremost, the NPD has employed the Compstat since 1997, and the department was receptive to conducting interviews. In addition, its large size, crime ridden environment, openness to change in the past, initiation of a number of innovative programs, reorganization of the department, and reduction in crime rates after the implementation of Compstat made this police department a good and interesting sample of study.

2.2. Data Collection

Data regarding performance aspect of Compstat in the NPD was collected through in-depth interviews of police officers in different ranks and positions, observation of the Compstat meetings and analysis of documents. The researcher conducted 26 interviews with members of the NPD. The basic sampling strategy was to reach a sample of individuals from diverse groups and varied functions within the organization. There were a representative number of officers from a wide range of ranks and units. This enabled cross-checking of information in an effort to establish different views held concerning the performance aspect of Compstat (Olie, 1994).

Observation was another data collection method used for this study. The main setting for observations was the Compstat meetings. The researcher attended nine meetings in 6 months and made observation approximately 18 hours. These meetings, as the most visible component of Compstat, presented a unique context in which to examine certain practices and conversations conducted in the scope of Compstat. They also allowed to researcher to understand how Compstat contributed performance of the NPD, if any.

Documents are critical to the function of organizations. In this study, a variety of documents were analyzed. These documents included the Compstat package and reports, organization web site, brochures, general orders and memos.

2.3. Data Analysis

The data obtained from the interviews, observation and aforementioned documents were used for the analysis and interpretation of the performance aspect of the Compstat in this specific organization. The research took an inductive approach to examining the present phenomenon, insofar as the “categories emerge out of the examination of the data ... without firm preconceptions dictating relevance in concepts and hypotheses beforehand” (Walker, 1985: 58). The overall data analysis process can be considered in terms of two interrelated concepts: analysis and interpretation. Lindlof and Taylor (2002: 210-211) defined analysis: “the process of labeling and breaking down raw data and reconstituting them into patterns, themes, concepts, and propositions. Interpretation is the process of making construal”. In this process, both analysis and interpretation come together to clarify the meaning and make knowledge claims about the given research topic.

Specifically, the constant comparative method was used for analysis and interpretation. In fact, this method appears to be particularly useful in coding a large amount of texts, forming categories, establishing the conceptual boundaries of the categories, assigning the segments to categories, and summarizing (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The analysis process, within the scope of the constant comparative method, can be summarized as follows. First of all, in order to prepare the data for analysis, all interview statements, observation notes and documents were logged into the computer. The Atlas-ti software that is designed for content analysis of large amounts of transcripts and other written documents was used for the analysis and interpretation of data, and it facilitated a coherent means of coding, categorizing, analyzing, and interpreting. This software provided the flexibility and non-hierarchical coding of data compatible with the constant comparative method.

The analysis process involved three stages: *open coding*, *axial coding*, and *selective coding*. Open coding can be considered as a form of content analysis where the data are read, coded, and categorized into themes on the basis of ‘look-alike’ characteristics rather than predetermined categories (Orlikowski, 1993). The purpose is to “group similar events, happenings, and objects under a common heading or classification” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 103). Within this iterative process, a total of about 141 codes were generated. This process ended by classifying 141 codes under the 14 broader categories. The next step, axial coding, is “the process of relating categories to their subcategories and linking categories at the level of properties and dimensions” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 142). During axial coding, these categories were reviewed and re-sorted in order to relate them to subcategories, linkages, and relationships that have greater explanatory power to answer research questions. The final step is selective coding, in which core categories are selected and systematically integrated to narrate what is happening, form general explanations, generate a larger theoretical stance, and make knowledge claims about the organization studied (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).

3. Findings

3.1. Perceived Success of Compstat

Compstat has been in place for more than sixteen years in the NPD. There is a full agreement among officers about the contribution of Compstat to the performance of this organization. Through these years, not only Compstat, but also policing approaches, officers’ understanding of police work, society, and the technology that supports policing have changed extensively, all of which have something to do with the performance of police organizations. As such, it would be wrong to assume that the perceived performance improvement of the officers in the NPD since the introduction of Compstat can be fully explained by referring to this model. Officers specifically mentioned the role of technology, leadership, generational differences, and years of experience, and environmental change in these years, all of which certainly improved the performance of the NPD.

This is not to say that officers were not able to identify the role of Compstat in this process. Among all these issues to be considered, it is clearly and strongly evidenced in the statements of officers, and displayed to some extent in their organizational practices that *this model improved the performance of the NPD*. In response to the question of whether Compstat has improved the performance of the NPD over these years, nearly all officers replied in a supportive manner, with statements such as, “Absolutely, yes. I think we would be lost today

without it”, and; “Overall, I think it was necessary and it has been a success. It improved our performance. We are doing better than we did. If we did not have Compstat, we wouldn’t be as successful as we are today.” There are many other examples that illustrate that the officers really believe in the positive role of Compstat in improving this organization and its performance.


As shown in the interview statements, officers strongly support the improvement of the performance after Compstat. In addition, observation of the Compstat meetings and documents support the statements of officers regarding the performance improvement in the NPD after Compstat. Within this framework, documents and observation of the meetings enabled confirmation officers’ statement regarding the improvement of the performance; contextualized the explanations of the officers; and showed how these perceived changes are manifested in the Compstat meetings and daily practices of the officers in the NPD.

3.2. Performance and Compstat: Assessment

It is clear that performance based management became an inevitable part of police management in the NPD after the implementation of Compstat. Two basic mechanisms in Compstat, *assessment with tangible indicators* and *follow up*, changed the evaluation of success and failure in the management, which, in turn, brought competition and careerism in the management of the NPD.

The most important performance document produced in this model is ‘*Compstat package*’. Central Compstat unit prepares Compstat package about all precincts and units on a weekly basis and present this to the police chief. Similarly, crime control officers in each precinct or unit prepare a Compstat package just for their commanders. Compstat packages basically have two interlocked parts which provide a base for the assessment of performance. One part is about crime statistics, crime rates, crime analysis, and patterns (i.e., time, place, victim, and suspect) for each crime type. Crime statistics were prepared on weekly and monthly bases for seven index crimes. All these crimes were presented in a comparable manner to those from the same time period in the last year. A big part of the Compstat package used in the meetings included these statistics about crime rates, which were used to make further analysis in the form of crime trends, crime locations, time, and patterns. In fact, centrality of crime rates was confirmed by a large number of officers in the NPD as illustrated with the following statement: “Ultimately, the most important measure is the amount of crime we have. That is the ultimate measure of what we are doing.” The most basic and foregrounding measure of success and failure are these crime rates. Commanding officers are questioned on any increase, and its causes, and asked for their plan to respond to it on regular bases in the meetings.

The other document produced as a part of Compstat package is ‘*precinct commander profile*’. In fact, the uniqueness of Compstat is not the focus on crime rates, but the use of a number of other indicators called productivity numbers. An example of precinct commander profile is shown in the *Figure-1*.

Precinct Commander Profile										
Do Not Type in Highlighted Fields										
2nd Precinct										
Date Submitted: 8/4/2009										
Commanding Officer: Captain										
Rank: Captain		Years in Rank: 3 Years			Date Assigned C.O.: December 1, 2008		Date of Promotion: December 29, 2005			
Executive Officer: NONE					Assignment Officer: Lieutenant					
Rank: Captain		Years in Rank: 3 Years			Date Assigned C.O.: April 17, 2006		Date of Promotion: April 17, 2006			
Integrity Control officer: Lieutenant					Operations Officer: NONE					
Rank: Lieutenant		Years in Rank: 3 Years			Date Assigned C.O.: April 17, 2006		Date of Promotion: April 17, 2006			
The following statistical data is for the week ending: 8/2/2009										
Precinct Personnel:				IOP				Avg. Response Time		
	2009	2008	% Change	2009	2008	% Change	Code/Unit	12-8	8-4	4-12
Captain	3	2	50.00%	1	0	#DIV/0!	8/60 sec			
Lieutenant	8	7	14.29%	CAP			7/90sec	6:07	7:52	3:01
Sergeant	13	8	62.50%	2009	2008	% Change	6/5 min	4:54	16:11	7:00
Police Officers	112	104	7.69%	0	1	0.00%	5/30 min	4:11	3:09	7:39
Civilians	3	2	50.00%							
Arrests:			Field Interrogations			Summons				
2009	2008	% Change	2009	2008	% Change	2009	2008	% Change		
112	144	-22.22%	213	223	-0.62%	810	805	0.62%		
Domestic Viol Incidents			Quality of Life Summons							
2009	2008	% Change	2009	2008	% Change					
17	0	#DIV/0!	395	206	91.75%					
Precinct Overtime:										
Current Week					YTD					
Court	\$4,247.57				\$88,857.57					
Arrest	\$84.36				\$12,253.07					
Operational	\$4,634.94				\$252,758.79					
Administrative										
Reimbursable										
Total	\$8,966.87				\$353,869.43					

Unable to obtain the number of D.V. incidents for 2008 from SARA.

City of Los Angeles Police Department

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This one page overview shows nearly all measures of productivity in a precinct. These include number of arrests, field interrogations, quality of life summonses, search warrants, tickets, vehicle stops, cases closed or open, and complaints against personnel, average response time, sick time, and precinct overtime and its monetary equivalent. Statistics (i.e., arrests, field investigations, search warrants, vehicle stops, cases closed or open) are also prepared for each crime type such as robbery, narcotics, and burglary in sections that are designed to give specific information on those crimes. All these numbers are indicators that are used to see the activity of each precinct. Commanders are kept responsible for the activity in their precincts. These written documents allow the upper echelon to check these numbers relentlessly and take necessary measures. They question commanders on these numbers in the Compstat meetings or other settings. The following quotation of a commander brought together all measures used in the NPD:

This is a time analysis report which indicated how quickly our units get to calls for service. It is broken down by the type of call for service. We prioritize our calls anywhere from code 2 up to code 8. Code 8 is the most urgent and code 2 is the least urgent. We dispatch the units based on the need. I prioritize assignment and make sure that somebody gets there. We set goals to make sure that we have a quick response. We usually do not discuss sick time, absenteeism at Compstat, but it is something important to running the command. We look at officer sick time; we have a sick policy that takes measures for officers that take much sick time, which can result in from a verbal warning up to termination if they continue to abuse it. As far as the Compstat process is concerned, we look at crimes. Performance indicators would be number of arrests officers make, field interrogations in which officers stop somebody and question them about what is going on in the area, summonses, motor vehicle summonses, moving summonses, and parking summonses, and we have something quality of life summonses to address lesser types of crimes in the city. But it is important for us to address quality of life problems we have in the neighborhoods. If people get summonses, people have to go to court. It could be anything, littering.

Observation of the meetings showed that these measures were questioned by the upper echelon on a regular basis. This is not to say that all these measures are questioned one by one. As observed in six months, there is a focus on number of arrests, field interrogations, vehicle stops, search warrants, and quality of life summonses. It is common to hear questions such as, "How many burglary arrests did you have? What kind of activities do you have?" This does not mean that other indicators were not taken into account in the NPD. As

stated by one officer, depending on the emerging problems, some other indicators can also be questioned. In addition, some of these indicators were sent to the police director separately:

We have overtime, sick time, and productivity. We get most of that information from human resources. We make a comparison if sick time is up or down, overtime is up or down. Then, we report it to the police director. And, so he would know and take whatever necessary measures.

This long list of indicators shows the focus of Compstat on performance measurement, which was not the case in the NPD before Compstat. The following interview excerpt illustrates this fact: "This is all stuff that we did not do before Compstat. We did it just kind of like, if we got around to it, not very largely, a matter of fact."

Another important aspect of Compstat regarding performance measurement is the need for compatibility of productivity numbers with crime rates and crime analysis. The following statement of one officer clarified this point:

If crime is down in a precinct, the decrease in productivity is understandable. However, if crime is up, but productivity is down, then it is a bad indicator. In such a case, it is thought that either someone is not doing something or they are not where they are supposed to be.

As mentioned, any increase or decrease in productivity numbers is evaluated along with crime rates. Compstat even goes further and checks for the compatibility between productivity numbers and crime analysis (i.e., time, location). In other words, any of these productivity measures need to be conducted based on analysis of crime. The following statements of two officers showed how this was adapted in the NPD:

If you have high accidents, you expect more motor vehicle summonses. If you have a lot of robberies in a sector, they expect people to be field inquiries in those locations, motor vehicle stops. They want to see you are addressing the problems in a proper way.

I have to write certain amount of tickets; I have to make a certain amount of arrests; it is not like that. I don't think it makes them work hard. It is more about where focus should be. In other words, if there is a problem over here, you just spend your time over there.

There are times in the meetings that you can observe how this connection was questioned. For instance, the following dialogue between the police director and precinct commander in a meeting illustrated this:

Police Director: "What are you planning to do for 212?"

Commander: Right now, we focus on 212 commercial burglaries.

Police Director: What kind of activities do you have in 212?"

On the same line of thought, the police director criticized a commander as follows: "Anti-crimes had no productivity at shooting locations last night. Commanders need to prioritize based on the rates of violence in sectors." In fact, this system, with all these indicators, implies a new world for the management of police organizations.

3.3. Performance and Compstat: Follow-up Mechanisms

Not only having these performance tools but also following up on those indicators systematically is a key factor for the success of Compstat in the NPD. Most of the performance based management systems, even the best ones in theory fail as there are not any strong follow up mechanisms that create a sense of obligation among officers to adopt it. In contrast to other initiatives, Compstat in the NPD has certain aspects that allow the upper echelon to monitor officers on a regular basis to determine if they are doing their job based on these performance tools. The Compstat meetings which have been conducted in the NPD for the last sixteen years create a sense of obligation to consider all these performance tools. The commanders in the NPD know that there will be a meeting the following week or in two weeks in which they will be questioned on a number of things, including the problems that came up in the previous meetings. The following statement of one officer shows how this follow up mechanism works in the NPD: "You put them (commanders) in the hot seat. Commanding officers say that I am going to address this particular issue in my command, when they come back, I bet they do." It was clearly observed in the meetings that Compstat functions to monitor the initiatives and plans in the NPD. The police director's question, "What did you do about this initiative?" demonstrates how this follow up is put into practice. Additionally, the upper echelon's participation to these meetings brings supervisor control in the system. Commanders know that Compstat can be a good platform if you want to be promoted. From the management point of view, this initiative makes officers work hard and functions as a platform for career oriented officers in the NPD. As such, it brings competition and supports a career oriented system in the NPD, which was not the case before Compstat, as confirmed by a number of officers.

To summarize, with all components and principles, Compstat can be considered more than a performance measurement tool; it is a functional and effective performance based management system. The inclusion of all these measures, use of all these measures based on analysis, and the follow up mechanism make Compstat an indispensable initiative for the NPD. Nearly all study participants seemed to internalize

performance measurement as a new value that should be used in policing. In short, the NPD seemed to institutionalize performance based management system that goes along with competition and careerism.

4. Discussion

The implementation of Compstat in the NPD was highly structured. In line with the recent movement toward performance-based management, Compstat in the NPD relied on targeted goals and objectives that went beyond retrospective analysis and record keeping. Not surprisingly, the main goal was to reduce crime, which was regularly compared to the same time period in the previous years. Commanders always competed with the figures from the previous year and with other commanders. In that sense, clearly defined organizational goals, strategies, and missions were linked with the measures, which had been translated into tangible indicators. These measures were monitored regularly in the Compstat meetings.

There are a core set of management principles built around comprehensive crime analysis techniques and coordinated and collaborative problem-solving (Dabney, 2010). A culture of information sharing and accountability guided the short and long term planning and operations of the NPD. The meetings, with their well defined rules and practices, provided a basis for information sharing, accountability, and assessment of the overall success of the plans in fulfilling the goals. Thus, the overall purpose of Compstat in the NPD resembles a strategic planning system in which organizations define their priorities, missions, and directions and translate them into clear plans that will be measured by standard measures, and evaluated and followed up with through accountability. In this system, all precinct commanders were aware that they were held accountable for the results that they obtained and the problem solving strategies that they adopted. Therefore, regular Compstat meetings established a measure of performance, accountability for goal achievement, and a sustainable process to ensure that the strategies have been carried out. These meetings also served as a way to assess which strategies work and which do not (Buntin, 1999).

Turning to the issues of a performance measurement with a data-driven approach, each unit became expert at compiling complex data that captured offending, arrest numbers, and many other figures. However, less progress was made in evaluating the meaning of this data and coming up with creative and innovative problem solving and police tactics. This data was not used to identify the underlying causes of crime problems and respond to them smartly and proactively. Rather, officers relied more on personal experience, anecdotal evidence, and traditional police tactics and strategies. Even if officers came up with innovative or wise plans and strategies in the meetings, "the spirit of these plans often got lost between the Compstat meeting and the front line officers, who thought as though there was no strategic vision guiding their daily activities" (Dabney, 2010, p.49). In addition, the need to respond to crimes quickly undermined the need to pursue the most effective innovative strategies, and led to follow traditional tactics and strategies.

Compstat seemed to help police officers to consider more academic and scientific approaches in policing. Different policing approaches were used electively based on the information collected and analyzed within the scope of Compstat. Officers in general had a sense of appropriateness and acceptance of proactive policing that went along with a 'can do' mentality. Their job was traditionally to respond to crimes after they had been committed, and they measured success by the portion of crimes that were solved with arrests and convictions. The main difference after Compstat was in officers' understanding that police can reduce crime using initiatives like Compstat.

Current and accurate information in the form of statistics, crime analysis, and patterns became essential in policing instead of solely anecdotal evidence and experience. In spite of certain limitations, information having and sharing became the culture of the police organization. It was evident that Compstat meetings became the central place for sharing information and bonding. The upper echelon and officers from different units and ranks came together on a regular basis to talk about problems and possible solutions, which creates less hierarchical communication within the organization. There was much more focus on crime analysis, crime statistics, and crime patterns, which were essential to determining crime patterns, crime tactics and deploying resources accordingly. In addition, the display of information at crime information centers, roll calls before each shift, and production and distribution of a great amount of documents became habitual practices, which contributed the centrality of having, sharing, and using information for managerial and operational purposes. The way of discussing crime and evaluating the performance of a precinct, unit, or a commander certainly changed with Compstat.

The most prominent change in terms of performance management was accountability. Compstat was intended to bring about accountability and responsibility for reducing crime, which, in turn, changed officers' work habits. The basic idea behind accountability was to hold officers accountable for their performance, which

included knowing their command, problems in their command, and showing an intelligent, attentive effort in responding to these problems. All these points were questioned in the Compstat meetings. This simple but effective mechanism was mainly put into practice in the meetings and brought a whole new way of doing business with increased responsibility, accessibility, and availability of commanders.

Accountability and responsibility, flexibility, performance measurement that leads to careerism and competition can be seen as new management values that emerged in Compstat era. Performance orientation became an inevitable part of police management. Two basic mechanisms in Compstat, assessment with tangible indicators and follow up, changed the evaluation of success and failure in the management. The NPD officers seemed to institutionalize an outcome oriented culture that went along with competition and careerism.

Therefore, the case of the NPD illustrates the relentless efforts and struggles of the upper echelon to change the mindsets of police officers. Follow up strategies in regular Compstat meetings and the focus on performance measurement in transfers and promotion created a sense of obligation among officers in this organization. All these practices affected the mindsets of police officers (i.e., inefficient practices will not be tolerated) and created a sense of the new ways things should be done.

Conclusion

The Compstat was clearly very helpful in the improvement of the NPD. However, a close scrutiny of the practices shows that there is room for improvement. There are certain points to be improved in accountability and information sharing. The level of innovation and creativity is more problematic than accountability and information sharing. A meaningful, honest, and authentic dialogue in the meetings is essential to getting different perspectives and revising the current practices. In the same line of thought, authenticity in the decision making process and empowerment of mid-level officers who are held responsible for any problem in the precincts are two interrelated points to be improved to support a climate for information sharing, innovation and risk taking.

Another problem in Compstat is the ignorance of problems that are beyond the control of officers. While Compstat reinforces a '*can do*' mentality and increases accountability and responsibility of officers, it is necessary to consider possibility of social, economic, or other problems in the increase of crime rates. In some cases, the upper echelon ignored the larger problems by holding officers responsible for any increase of crime rates. This might be disappointing for officers who try to influence crime even though they don't have the capacity to do so. This point should be considered in order to avoid officer burn out as a result of questioning for any increase in crime rates or emerging problems. In this sense, organizational members should be evaluated for things that are in their capacity.

Compstat meetings are the most visible and key factor for the success of the model. The discourse of the meetings showed that officers consider crime patterns, statistics, digital maps, and talk about these things more than before. There were a range of concepts that manifest the new ways of doing the job and the new world of policing. In particular, the common use of concepts such as, '*crime analysis and patterns, computers, crime maps, daily information, effective tactics, and accountability*' show the new face of policing and emerging cultural values in Compstat era.

However, there is still room for the improvement of structure in the meetings. These meetings are held with the participation of a number of ranked officers in the NPD. Involvement of different officers in the change process, specifically in the Compstat meetings in the case of the Compstat, at least would increase the level of understanding and information regarding what was expected and why. Organizational members at all levels of an organization affected by change should be involved in certain practices at certain degrees, based on their position, rank, and changing responsibilities associated with the change initiative. Involvement will generate support for change and success of the change modalities. This was particularly important for the case of Compstat, and it is likely to be important for most change initiatives that need to be reflected on the ground. The lack of involvement and awareness of how change initiatives influence or should influence the daily practices may lead to the lack of change in the particular behavior and daily practices. Given this point, each organization needs to consider involving its members in certain mechanisms to make them aware of new initiatives and their role in this initiative. As such, the goals and strategies formulated in Compstat meetings would be better reflected on the ground rather than diluted or diverted as they make their way down to the street level.

The number of participants, their seating position and the room design, and the manner of questions could be redesigned to increase the contribution of all officers. In this sense, the number of participants and their role in these kinds of gatherings need to be redefined; and their active contributions also need to be encouraged

to spur brain storming and promote a learning environment. This new form of design, which is intended to encourage interaction, can be tested and refined to achieve the desired goals.

Compstat is one of these change initiatives that has been adopted by numerous organizations in the last decade to address the emerging challenges and opportunities. The success of Compstat and specific initiatives like Compstat certainly requires an understanding of the nature of the change process, factors that facilitate or impede change efforts, and the sources of resistance and receptivity. This study analyzed Compstat from the performance perspective. There are certain lessons in this study for the practitioners who plan to adapt these kinds of models. They need to take into account these lessons and manage and guide change process accordingly.

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